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TAKINGS AND THE POLICE POWER
JOSEPH L. SAX*
If the government wants to convert a private house into a post office, or
run a new highway through a farm, or build a dam which will flood nearby
land,1 it is going to have to compensate the losses sustained as a result of
these activities. In such cases courts uniformly hold that property has been
taken by the government, thus bringing into operation the constitutional man-
date that private property may not be taken for public use without just compen-
sation.2 But if government prohibts the continuance of a business which has
been established for a long time,2 or outlaws certain businesses altogether,4 or
prohibits the use of land for any of the purposes which give it substantial
economic value,5 it may not have to pay a penny. In cases of this type, where
the government is engaged in zoning, nuisance abatement, conservation, busi-
ness regulation, or a host of other functions, courts will usually decide that
the economic loss suffered by the private citizen was a mere incident of the
lawful exercise of the "police power," and thus not compensable.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (compen-
sation required).
2. This article deals only with problems of interpretation of the federal Constitution.
Like provisions in the various state constitutions have sometimes been given quite different
interpretations. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States,
34 MANN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
The constitutional provision at issue here is that language of the fifth amendment which
provides "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
This requirement has traditionally been viewed as incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment. Chicago, B. & Q.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897); see United States
ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943). It is this language of the fifth amend-
ment which is referred to throughout the article as the "taking provision" or the "compen-
sation provision."
3. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408-09 (1915).
4. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
5. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342,
20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
6. The term "police power" has no exact definition. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954). It is used by the courts to identify those state and local governmental restrictions
and prohibitions which are valid and which may be invoked without payment of compen-
sation. In its best known and most traditional uses, the police power is employed to protect
the health, safety, and morals of the community in the form of such things as fire regula-
tions [Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 146 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting)], garbage disposal
control [Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905)], and restrictions upon prostitution
[L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900)] and liquor [Boston Beer Co. v.
Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878)]. But it has never been thought that government author-
ity under the police power was limited to those narrow uses. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876) (price control). See generally Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S, 27, 31 (1885) ; Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887); Chicago & A.R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76-
77 (1915).
Most of the federal regulation which will be discussed here arises not under a police
power but under the authority to regulate interstate commerce. But a parallel conflict exists
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Though all agree that compensation is required only for a governmental
"taking" of property and not for losses occasioned by mere "regulation," the
generality of the theory thus formulated is of little help in deciding any
given case. In some specific instances it has become clear that the compen-
sation clause of the fifth amendment predictably will or will not be held ap-
plicable.7 Nevertheless, the predominant characteristic of this area of law is
a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results. The principle upon
which the cases can be rationalized is yet to be discovered by the bench: what
commentators have called the "crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court doc-
trine" s has effectively been acknowledged by the Court itself, which has de-
veloped the habit of introducing its uniformly unsatisfactory opinions in this
area with the understatement that "no rigid rules"D or "set formula"' 0 are
available to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.
Two basic approaches have been developed by the courts to distinguish
takings from police power regulations. The earlier theory, articulated in the
main by the first Justice Harlan, drew on traditional legal concepts for its
rules. Notions such as appropriation of a proprietary interest, physical invasion
giving rise to a prescriptive easement, and nuisance were its basic tools. The
second approach originated with Justice Holmes in the first quarter of this
century, when the expansion of governmental regulation yielded a proliferation
of claims for compensation by aggrieved owners of private property. Holmes'
approach denied the utility of artificial legalisms such as Harlan employed.
Holmes proposed reliance on a pragmatic, case-by-case resolution of the
policy-conflict which he perceived to lie at the heart of the problem - the
conflict between public need and private loss. Neither of these two approaches
has proved able to produce satisfactory results. Harlan's theory reduces the
constitutional issue to a formalistic quibble; an airport noise case, for example,
may turn on whether the planes have physically penetrated that segment
of air directly above the claimant's land. The Holmesian approach has equal
failings. Its central premise - that the right to compensation depends on
the magnitude of loss suffered - is historically unsound, has never in fact
been acceptable to the Court, and wasn't even followed by Holmes himself.
It is the purpose of this article to elaborate this analysis of the traditional
between the asserted authority to regulate without paying compensation and the demands
of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799,
808 (1950). Where federal regulation of water is involved, the compensation question is
complicated by the presence of the so-called navigation servitude. See generally Mforreale,
Federal Powers in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Com-
pensation, 3 NAT. R-S. J. 1 (1963).
7. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (compmation
required) ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (no compensation required).
8. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Laz, 1962 SuPpmm Comr REvmxw 63.
9. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
10. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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approaches to the problem of taking, to isolate the shortcomings of these
theories, and to propose a more fruitful approach.
BACKGROUND TO THE MODERN CASES
Because most of the taking cases have come to the Supreme Court by way
of state regulation, the bulk of "early" authority in this field is found subse-
quent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. For this reason it was
not Marshall or his contemporaries, but the first Mr. Justice Harlan, writing
during the last decades of the 19th century, who was the principal judicial
architect of compensation theory. It is therefore appropriate to begin with
a discussion of his opinion in the landmark case of Mitgler v. Kansas."
In that case the state had forbidden the sale and manufacture of intoxicating
liquors. It was argued that since the claimant's breweries were erected when
it was lawful to engage in the manufacture of beer and were of little value
for other purposes, the regulation destroyed, or at least materially diminished,
the value of that property, and thus could not constitutionally be enforced
without the payment of compensation. Holding that no compensation was
due, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that this case "must be governed by principles
that do not involve the power of eminent domain, in the exercise of which
property may not be taken for public use without compensation."1 2
To support this holding, he proposed two corollary theories. First, he said,
this regulation was not in any sense a "taking" because it involved no ap-
propriation of property for the public benefit but merely a limitation upon
use by the owner for certain purposes declared to be injurious to the com-
munity. This theory Harlan apparently derived from the literal language
of the fifth amendment, which deals only with the "taking" of property. While
the government's acquisition of a fee simple in the property would obviously
be a'taking, one cannot, as Justice Harlan saw it, describe as a taking of
property
legislation [which] does not disturb the owner in the control or use of
his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it,
but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain
forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.18
Justice Brandeis later expanded upon this theory of the nature of the police
power as compared with a constitutional "taking" when he noted that:
The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The
State does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The State merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious,
- as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions,
11. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
12. Id. at 668.
13. Id. at 669.
[l.74: 36
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the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free
to enjoy his property as heretofore.1 4
Under this first theory, then, the constitutional issue turns upon whether the
government has asserted a proprietary interest for itself in the affected
property. 5
The second Harlan theory looks not to the role of the government (whether
proprietor or mere prohibitor) but to the quality of the property owner's
activity which calls forth government action. Harlan distinguished innocent
from noxious uses. Thus, the operation of a fertilizer factory in the midst
of a city 16 is a noxious use which the government can abate without having
to make compensation, no matter how great the economic loss involved. The
rationale is that no one can obtain a vested right to injure or endanger the
public. Thus the abatement of a noxious use is not a taking of property, since
uses in contravention of the public interest are not property.'7 Conversely, if
the government interferes with "unoffending property,"' 8 compensation is
required.
Thus the Harlan theories distinguish takings from exercises of the police
power by artful definition of the terms "taking" and "property." Under the
Harlan theory the constitutional question never turns upon an examination
of the economic consequences of the government's action; these theories pos-
tulate a qualitative difference between the police power and a taking, not
a mere difference of degree.
Within a relatively narrow area Harlan's conceptual approach produces
not only clear-cut distinctions, but also satisfactory results. And in Harlan's
day the standard sort of government activity - regulation of liquor,19 pros-
titution,20 fertilizer works 2' or brickyards22 - can quite understandably
be described as the mere regulation (rather than appropriation) of noxious
(rather than innocent) uses; such activity is easily distinguished from the
invasion which occurs when the government appropriates property for a
highway or a post office. In addition, since the exercise of the police power
was generally limited in Harlan's time to the sort of rudimentary functions
just mentioned, it was quite possible to accept those functions, and the Harlan
14. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J, dissent-
ing).
15. Under this theory, the government apparently need not be the titleholder of record
so long as it asserts a proprietary control over the property and affirmatively uses the
property for its own purposes. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-
78 (1871).
16. E.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
17. Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 330 (1905).
18. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 679 (1887).
19. Ibid.
20. L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
21. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
22. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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theory, without seeing any substantial or fundamental threat to the institution
of private property.
23
As the scope of governmental regulations grew, however, the economic im-
pact of government regulation undermined the rationality of Harlan's con-
ceptual distinctions. Particularly with the growth of zoning, conservation
legislation, and pervasive business regulation, the impact of the police power,
however defined as qualitatively distinct, upon the traditional perquisites
of private ownership could hardly be ignored.
It was at this point in history that Harlan's service on the Court ended
and Justice Holmes assumed leadership in the development of the compen-
sation theory. He arrived just in time to face the full challenge of changing
concepts of the governmental function. As Frankfurter pointed out in his
classic study of Justice Holmes, "there were only two important measures
of economic legislation on the federal statute books when Mr. Justice Holmes
came to the Court, and these two . .. had only somnolent vitality."'
4 But it
was a time of dramatic changes. In the federal field "a vast field of hitherto
free enterprise was brought under governmental supervision." 25 And from
the states "local anti-trust laws, shorter hours acts, minimum wage laws,
blue-sky laws, banking laws, conservation enactments, illustrate only some
of the topics on which laws came ... for eventual judgment by Mr. Justice
Holmes' Court."
2 6
What was unique and truly original about Holmes' contribution was that
he saw the issue not in conceptual or formal terms, but as a manifestation
of social conflict. Established economic interests were engaged in a battle
for survival against the forces of social change; to Holmes it was constitu-
tionally irrelevant whether the battle was at any given time being waged in
a desirable fashion.2* For him it was sufficient that interests on both sides
had some claims of legitimacy, and the struggle was in any event "inevitable,
unless the fundamental axioms of society and even the fundamental conditions
of life, are to be changed. '2 8 The job of the law was, as Holmes saw it, not
23. Of course, there were exceptions that foreshadowed future developments; e.g.,
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (price regulation).
24. FRANxKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HoLIIES AND THE SUPREME COURT 50 (1951).
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 51,
27. That events were in conflict with his personal beliefs is evidenced by his private
description of the changes being effected as "the petty larceny of the police power," 1
HOLuEs-LAsxi LErERs 457 (Howe ed. 1953). But in his judicial capacity he never
manipulated the law to fit his own convictions. Typical is his comment in the New York
theatre ticket broker case:
I am far from saying that I think this particular law a wise and rationale provision.
That is not my affair. But if the people of the State of New York speaking by their
authorized voice say that they want it, I see nothing in the Constitution of the
United States to prevent their having their will.
Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 447 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
28. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
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to fashion otherworldly conceptualisms but to assure that the battle of conflicting
interests is "carried on in a fair and equal way.'ufl
In seeking a test of fairness Holmes found the Harlan approach lacking:
while he never seems to have discussed or specifically rejected the proprietary
interest, invasion, or noxious use tests, his own decisions rest upon entirely
different grounds. Holmes saw no qualitative difference between traditional
takings and traditional exercises of the police power, but only a continuum
in which established property interests were asked to yield more or less to
the pressures of public demands.
Fairness, as Holmes finally formulated it, required some restraint on the
part of all parties. The owner of private property must concede that the
"constitutional requirements of compensation when property is taken cannot
be pressed to its grammatical extreme; that property rights may be taken
for public purposes without pay if you do not take too much; that some play
must be allowed to the joints if the machine is to work."310 And on the other
hand those who would promote change must recognize that the "play" in
the machine "must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are
gone" and "private property disappears."31
The specific point on which Holmes seems to have chosen to focus the
constitutional question was the extensiveness of the economic harm inflicted
by the regulation. While he never flatly stated that degree of economic harm
was the critical factor in his theory, a reading of his opinions leaves little
doubt that this was indeed the theory he devised.32 "[Tihe question narrows
itself," he once said, "to the magnitude of the burden imposed . . . . M And
in the Hudson Water case, he said that while the government may properly
diminish values somewhat under the police power, if the exercise of that
power makes the affected property "wholly useless, the right of property
would prevail over the other public interest, and the police power would fail."
3 4
When he upheld a regulation against a claim that compensation was required,
it was usually upon the ground that it involved only a "comparatively insig-
nificant taking"3 5 or "the infliction of some fractional and relatively small
losses." 36
In practice, Holmes was more permissive in his application of the fifth
amendment than might be inferred from the terms of his diminution of value
test. He participated in cases which held,37 and he occasionally expressly stated, s
29. Ibid.
30. Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927).
31. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922).
32. Id. at 413.
33. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907).
34. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1903).
35. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911).
36. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, S7 (1907).
37. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
38. Erie R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394, 410 (1921).
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that even total or near total destruction of property might sometimes be con-
stitutionally permitted without compensation. The extent of private loss could
be of less weight than the magnitude of public need embodied in the challenged
governmental action. But for our purposes it is only important to note that his
route to decision assumed that the function of the compensation clause was to
minimize private losses, and that the paramount significance of this policy con-
sideration made it rational to determine the constitutional validity of chal-
lenged governmental acts largely by reference to the extent of private loss
thereby occasioned.
Harlan and Holmes and their divergent attitudes provide the heritage upon
which the present Court has built. Precisely what the Court has synthesized
from the heritage is a question more easily asked than answered. For even
today it cites both Holmes and Harlan, both authoritatively.
The ambiguous position of the present Court is nicely demonstrated by its
opinion in the recent case of Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead. Appellants
owned a tract of land within the town of Hempstead upon which they had
been mining sand and gravel for over twenty years. As a result of their ex.
cavations, a large, deep, water-filled crater was created. During the years
since mining began the town had expanded around appellant's excavation, and
a series of steps by the town to regulate mining culminated in the enactment
of the challenged ordinance, which prohibited mining below the water table
and imposed an affirmative duty to refill any excavation presently below that
level. It was apparently conceded that the regulation completely destroyed
the mining utility of the property,4) although the record did not show what
value the property would have for other uses.
Although the opinion is technically mere dicta on the taking issue,41 the
extensive discussion of the problem indicates a good deal about the Court's
current attitude. Moreover, the case is particularly interesting in that it pre-
sented an example of modern zoning practice in one of its least appealing
forms - the bald suppression of a pre-existing lawful business, not a common-
law nuisancel in favor of subsequent residential development. In addition,
since it had been argued that the ordinance wholly destroyed the economic
value of the land,43 the case presents an opportunity to view the Court's hand-
39. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
40. Id. at 596.
41. The Court found the record barren of any evidence of economic detriment as a
result of the regulation. Thus, a meaningful decision on the taking issue was foreclosed;
whatever theory one follows, it is hard to find a taking if the victim suffered no loss, as
might have been the case here. Oddly enough, the Court also seemed to find either "a dearth
of relevant evidence" or some reason why decision was unnecessary on each of the other
significant issues presented. (369 U.S. at 595, 597 n.5). Yet instead of following the proper
or conventional means of remanding for further proceedings or dismissing per curilam [see
Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. Cm. L. Rev. 1, 35-36 (1948) ],
the Court chose to discuss the theory of the taking problem.
42. 369 U.S. at 593.
43. Brief for Appellant, p. 18, Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
see also 369 U.S. at 592.
[Vol. 74: 36
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ling of the Holmesian diminution of value theory under an extreme factual
situation.
The treatment of the precedents in Goldblatt is most interesting. The Court
more than once cites Justice Holmes' famous opinion in the Pennsylvania Coal
case. " That was the opinion in which Holmes most clearly articulated the
theory that the constitutional question turned primarily upon the degree of
economic injury imposed by the government regulation. Yet the Goldblatt
opinion leaves some doubt whether the Court is following, or repudiating,
the Holmesian doctrine. After saying that a legislative restriction is not to
be viewed as a taking merely because it "completely prohibits a beneficial
use to which the property has previously been put"48 the Court stated the
law in the following way:
That is not to say, however, that government action in the form of a
regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which consti-
tutionally requires compensation, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.... Al-
though a comparison of values before and after is relevant, see Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, it is by no means conclusive....40
Unfortunately, the incomplete state of the record in Goldblatt relieved the
Court from having to decide just when onerous became too onerous, or how
seriously the Court was going to take its stated deference to Mr. Justice
Holmes' theory.
Only five months after the Goldblatt opinion was issued, however, the Court
had an opportunity to make clear the meaning of that opinion. In Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. Los Alngeles 47 the Court had before it an appeal from
a decision upholding a zoning ordinance which completely destroyed the eco-
nomic value of the plaintiff's land.48 The constitutional question was squarely
44. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
45. 369 U.S. at 592.
46. Id. at 594.
47. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962). Noted in 50 C zix. L. REv. 896 (1962).
48. The record as to total destruction of value was unequivocal. The trial court had
found
that the subject property has great value if used for rock, sand and gravel excavation
but "no appreciable economic value" for any other purpose and ... any suggestion
that the property has economic value for any other use, including those for which it
was zoned, "is preposterous".
370 P.2d at 344. That finding was not disputed by the California Supreme Court nor by
counsel for the city in opposing the appeal (Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, pp. 7-8). Indeed
the rather pathetic attempts of both the city and the California Supreme Court to circum-
vent that finding merely accentuate its clarity. Counsel for the city took the extraordinary
position that the trial court had merely found that "the land in question had no other 'eco-
nomic' value than for rock and gravel quarrying but [not] that it had no other value at
all" Id. at 8. The California Supreme Court said "It must be conceded that in relation to
its value for the extraction of rock, sand and gravel the value of the property for any of
the described uses is relatively small if not minimal, and that as to a considerable part of
it seasonal flooding might prevent its continuous use for any purpose." 370 P.2d at 351.
It would be difficult to find a case with a more solid record of total economic injury.
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presented to the Court as "whether zoning ordinances which altogether destroy
the worth of valuable land by prohibiting the only economic use of which
it is capable effects a taking of real property without compensation. '4 Every-
thing about the case indicates that it would have been an ideal vehicle for
clarifying the ambiguity with which the Court had surrounded the constitu-
tional significance of diminution of value in Goldblatt. The constitutional
question was clearly presented and squarely decided below; the record was
free of those ambiguities and uncertainties which frequently seem to induce
a denial of review; and the appeal was competently presented by one of the
country's leading law firms. Yet the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of
a substantial federal question.
While the decision is technically on the merits, the real meaning of such
per curiam dispositions must always be considered as in some doubt.60 The
most that can be said is that such a dismissal of a case in which an ordinance
destroyed the entire value of the plaintiff's property casts some doubt on the
vitality of the Holmesian test.
Scepticism about the vitality of the diminution of value test would appear
thoroughly justified. Despite the deference accorded to Holmes' opinions, the
Court has not in fact been impressed by proof of diminution of value.61 In
several leading cases it has simply refused to consider the argument that the
degree of economic loss ranged upward from 75 per cent of value.5 2 Indeed,
as has been indicated, Holmes himself usually found that the regulation at
issue, though it might go "to the verge of the law,"53 rarely went beyond it.04
49. Brief for Appellant, Jurisdictional Statement, p. 5.
50. The significance of a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question has been
the subject of much critical comment. See Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at the
October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 HARv. L. REv. 579 (1940) ; Note, The Insubstatllial
Federal Question, 62 HARV. L. REV. 488 (1949); Note, Supremne Court Per Curilm Prac-
tice: A Critique, 69 HtAv. L. REv. 707 (1956) ; Note, Per Curiam Decisions of the Su-
preme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. Cni. L. REv. 279, 279-84 (1959). While the dismissal is
always technically a decision on the merits, and frequently utilized as a precedent, 69 HAtr.
L. REv. at 712, 62 HA.v. L. REv. at 494, HART & WECHSLER, FEDERAt COURT9 AVI) TUE
FEDERAL SYSTEm 574 (1953), the use of such decisions as a source of important sub-
stantive rules must be approached with caution, for it is also true that the Court uses
(actually misuses) the dismissal as it does the denial of certiorari - as a discretionary
denial of jurisdiction. 62 HARv. L. REv. at 492-94; Linehan v. Waterfront Commission, 347
U.S. 439 (1954) (dissenting opinion). And it is always possible that the dismissal is a
technical one, as for failure properly to present the federal question or lack of finality in
the judgment below. See 69 HARv. L. REv. at 711.
51. E.g., Queenside Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82-83 (1946) ; Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928).
52. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (75% loss);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (87-1/2% loss).
53. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
54. Erie R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394, 410 (1921) ; Block v. Hirsch,
256 U.S. 135 (1921) ; Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921) ; Levy Leasing
Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) ; Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids,
223 U.S. 655 (1912). See also Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79
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And in the Erie Railroad case,5 where it was argued that a regulation requiring
railroads to pay for grade separations might bankrupt the Erie, Holmes went
so far as to say "that the States might be so foolish as to kill a goose that lays
golden eggs for them, has no bearing on their constitutional rights."503
On the other hand, the diminution of value test cannot safely be ignored.
In Armstrong v. United States,57 decided just a few years ago, the Holmesian
approach may have been the critical factor in the decision. In that case the
United States had contracted for the building of ships under a contract pro-
viding that, in the event of default by the ship-building company, title to all
completed and uncompleted work would be transferred to the United States.
The default occurred, and a number of unfinished hulls were conveyed to the
United States. Since the shipbuilder had not paid for his materials, the peti-
tioner materiaman sought to enforce his state law materialman's lien against
the United States. The United States thereupon asserted its sovereign im-
munity, making the liens unenforceable. Petitioner sued in the Court of Claims,
arguing that the destruction of his liens by interposition of the immunity
doctrine constituted a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.
The case is of interest for the language which the Court employed in holding
that there had been a taking:
The total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which
constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth
Amendment "taking" and is not a mere "consequential incidence" of a
valid regulatory measure. Before the liens were destroyed, the lienholders
admittedly had compensable property. Immediately afterwards, they had
none. This was not because their property vanished into thin air. It was
because the Government for its own advantage destroyed the value of
the liens .... 58
The Armstrong opinion demonstrates the characteristic ambiguity of the
taking cases. It may well rest upon a finding of "total destruction ... of all
value" and thus exemplify the Court's use of the diminution of value approach.
Or it may rest upon a finding that the value was appropriated by the govern-
ment "for its own advantage" in a proprietary capacity; this view would be
a return to the old Harlan theory of "taking" based upon a finding that the
government has appropriated something like a fee interest to itself, rather
than merely regulating uses.5 9 A further complication demonstrated by Arm-
(1907); Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); contra, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
55. 254 U.S. 394 (1921).
56. Id. at 410.
57. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
58. Id. at 48.
59. This seems to be the most prevalent theory used by the Court today. Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357
U.S. 155, 165-66 (1958); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co, 339 U.S. 799 (1950);
Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946), where the court said, "it is the char-
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strong is that three dissenting members of the Court would have decided against
the claimant on yet another theory which sometimes finds its way into the
cases. They would have held there had been no taking because the economic
damage caused was a mere "consequential incidence" of the valid exercise of
the power of sovereign immunityY° This theory the majority rejected simply
by saying it was not so.
Thus the Court in Armstrong gives little guidance for future decisions. As
the foregoing discussion indicates, ambiguity seems to be the rule rather than
the exception in these cases. Nor is analysis aided by the fact that certain
quite prominent decisions in this area, full of dicta about the general rationale
of the taking-regulation dilemma, have in fact been decided upon some quite
special ground such as the existence of a wartime emergency.0 1 A survey of
the recent cases, of which those just discussed are typical, leaves the impression
that the Court has settled upon no satisfactory rationale for the cases and
operates somewhat haphazardly, using any or all of the available, often con-
flicting theories without developing any clear approach to the constitutional
problem. It seems appropriate to inquire whether the currently available theories
are capable of resolving the problem of the taking cases.
THE INVASION THEORY
Initially, it is obvious that whether the government takes title or possession
of the subject property is merely a matter of the form in which it chooses to
proceed. One of the oldest tricks of capitalizing on form is to try to depreciate
the value or inhibit the development of property through zoning, so that it
has a much reduced market value when the government gets around to buying
it.62 Thus the government gets most of the value of the property without any
acter of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it,... that determines the
question whether it is a taking."
60. The Court does not explain the "consequential incidence" theory, but previous cases
show that it is usually used in one of two ways. Perhaps most often, it is little more than
a synonym for the physical invasion theory. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750
(1947) ; Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 274-75 (1897). Sometimes the theory
apparently is invoked for the view that the harm imposed is justified by the fact that the
government act is independently privileged, and thus the injury must be borne as an in-
cidental consequence of a lawful act. The injury imposed by constitutionally protected libel
would be an example [e.g., for Representatives and Senators, U.S. Const., Art. I, See.
6(1)], as would the authority, based upon unbroken historical precedent, to impose fines
in a criminal proceeding. It was this latter ground which was invoked in Armstrong, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity being viewed as the privilege. See note 134 infra.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958);
United States v. Caltex (Philippines), 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
62. A classic example is found in Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A,2d
34 (1951). There the city council included plaintiff's undeveloped land in a plat of future
parks and passed an ordinance saying that no compensation would be paid for any improve-
ments put upon platted land within three years following the adoption of the ordinance.
In clear effect, the city "took" an interest in the land in the form of a three year option to
purchase at current value. The court had no trouble in finding it unconstitutional.
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formal "taking." New Jersey cities seem to have pioneered this technique.
The city of Plainfield once zoned plaintiff's property exclusively for school,
park, and playground use.€  And Newark tried to solve the ubiquitous airport
problem by height zoning all property in the vicinity of the airport so as to
avoid any interference with take off or landing of aircraft.G1 Another New
Jersey township zoned land for township sewage treatment, water supply fa-
cilities, and public recreational uses.es A Kentucky city zoned private land
as a ponding area for water storage in accordance with a flood control plan.o
The state courts have quite uniformly rejected these guises and required the
payment of compensation.
6 7
But a similar device slipped by the U.S. Supreme Court, at least in part,
because the Court applied the old invasion theory. In United States -,. Central
Eureka Mining Company,6s the War Production Board shut down privately
owned gold mines for the purpose of inducing experienced miners, who were
in very short supply, to go into more essential war work. In essence what the
government was doing was improving the labor situation by putting the com-
petition out of business. In the private realm this is ordinarily done by buying
the competitor. And in the ordinary situation this is what would have been
done. But instead of buying the right to operate the business in question, and
thus the economic power to induce a shift of labor to other industries, the
government merely "regulated" the gold mines out of business without in-
voking the magic talisman of a physical invasion.9 Form prevailed over sub-
stance; the Court's opinion turned in at least some degree on its finding that
"the Government did not occupy, use or in any manner take physical possession
63. Joint Meeting v. Borough of Middlese.' 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A2d 785 (1961).
64. Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L 370, 40 A.2d 559 (Sup. Ct.
1945). See note 147 infra.
65. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193
A2d 232 (1963).
66. Hager v. Louisville Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
67. See notes 62-66 supra. Some idea of the variety of problems and of potential devices
for dealing with them in the area of metropolitan development is given in the following
articles: Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HAIv. L Rsv. 1622 (1962);
Krasnowiecld & Paul, The Preser-ation of Open Spaces in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U.
P L. REV. 179 (1961); Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58
CoL tm. L. Rv. 650, 666-67 (1958).
68. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
69. Of course it is not suggested that the government by the closing order obtained
the value of the land itself or of the remaining minerals, which they would have got by a
fee simple purchase. All that properly was in the case was an alleged taing of the value
of operating the business for the duration of the order. The appropriation of this value
could have been as easily achieved by "regulation" as by a traditional taking. Of course
such partial takings are well known. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S.
373 (1945), where the government ousted a lessee and installed itself as a tenant, thus
taking not the fee simple or the entire leasehold but merely the rental value of part of the
unexpired leasehold interest in the subject property. In that case the government did not
circumvent the constitutional question by passing a regulation forbidding the use of the
property for rental purposes as to all parties except the United States.
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of the gold mines or of the equipment connected with them." 70 Compensation
was denied.
For constitutional questions to depend on such formalities is, as these cases
demonstrate, preposterous. The formal appropriation or physical invasion
theory should be rejected once and for all.
THE Noxious UsE THEORY
Analysis will show the noxious use test to be no more adequate than the
invasion test, although it has a beguiling simplicity and a perpetual appeal.
Since the taking provision is undoubtedly an attempt to find some fair balance
between the forces of change and the security of established interests, it has
seemed particularly appropriate to believe that the compensation problem
could be solved by saying that the uses which could be destroyed without
compensation were those that were noxious, or wrongful, or harmful in some
sense.
Of course it has long been obvious that all non-compensable uses could not
be described in terms of moral obloquy such as might be appropriate for the
regulation of prostitution or liquor. But a more modern version of the noxious
use test has had considerable popularity, and it is this version which must be
discussed. This is the "creation of the harm" test, based on the argument that
while in general established economic interests cannot be diminished merely
because of a resulting public benefit, that rule does not apply where the in-
dividual whose interest is to be diminished himself created the need for public
regulation by his conduct. The test has been most explicitly articulated in the
series of grade-separation cases which have come before the Court. 7 In those
situations a railroad track crosses a highway at street level. As highway traffic
increases, the legislature determines that in the interests of safety, a grade
separation is necessary. The cost of providing the improvement is usually
assessed in large part against the railroad. It has been almost universally the
rule that the railroad must pay, and the justification has been that:
Having brought about the problem, the railroads are in no position to
complain because their share of the cost of alleviating it is not based
solely on the special benefits accruing to them from the improvements.' 2
This test has received some recent scholarly support. 73 Certainly it has sonic
appeal. The imposition of safety regulations without compensation can be
justified on the ground that the property owners "created" the safety hazard;
similarly, social legislation such as workmen's compensation can be justified
as a need created by the employers' greed and heedlessness.
70. 357 U.S. at 165-66.
71. E.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Utilities Comm'rs, 346 U.S. 346, 352
(1953); Louisville Cent. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
72. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Utilities Comm'rs, 346 U.S. 346, 353 (1953).
73. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supretne
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuPrimE CouRT REviEw 63, 75, 80.
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This test is, however, insufficient to explain a great number of other very
important cases. Perhaps nuisance abatement is the best example. Zoning
out of nuisances is perhaps the classic example of the non-compensable exer-
cise of the police power. The typical nuisance situation is one in which a
perfectly lawful industrial enterprise located on the outskirts of the city
suddenly finds itself in the midst of a new and unforeseen residential
development24 It can hardly be said that the industrial user created this evil
which is now sought to be remedied; the patent fact is that the evil was created
by the unfortunate juxtaposition of two lawful activities. 75 Indeed that is
precisely the situation in the grade crossing cases. If all we mean by "creation
of the evil" is that one has located himself in a place which subsequently turns
out to be inconsistent with the public interest - and that is all that can be
said of the nuisance and grade crossing cases - then we must also say that
the farmer who buys land in a place which is subsequently needed for a state
highway has "created" the harm to be remedied and need not be given com-
pensation.
Actually the problem is not one of noxiousness or harm-creating activity
at all; rather it is a problem of inconsistency between perfectly innocent and
independently desirable uses. And what is true of the nuisance and grade
crossing cases is equally true of a great many cases in which the Court denies
compensation.
For example, incompatibility is the essence of the famous decision in Miller
v. Schoene.76 There the complainant was required to destroy his red cedar
trees because they produced cedar rust which was fatal to apple trees which
happened to be cultivated nearby. To say that the cedar tree owner caused
the harm is no more accurate than to say that the apple growers caused the
74. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
75. Nor can it be said that a nuisance is a somehow morally culpable use. As Mr.
Justice Sutherland succinctly put it, a nuisance is simply "a right thing in the wrong place,
- like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 388 (1926). And of course the place of location wmas in these cases a perfectly proper
place when the now-odious activity began.
Moreover, it is highly dangerous to try to give any qualitative evaluation of what are
called nuisances. The category is an open and ever changing one. It is notable that the
Court in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962), equivocated about
whether to call sand and gravel mining a nuisance. Surely it would be shocdng if the
constitutional issue were to turn upon the "niceties" of a verbal or historical exercise.
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928). Finally, it should be noted how the definitions
of nuisance change with the fashions. In 1843 the New York court held a bowling alley
to be a common-law nuisance for the reason that it was
A useless establishment, wasting the time of the owner, tending to fasten his own
idle habits on his family, and to draw the men and boys of the neighborhood into a
bad moral atmosphere - a place which, despite every care, will be attended by prof-
ligates, with evil communication, and at best with a waste of time and money, fol-
lowed by the multiplication of paupers and rogues ....
Tanner v. Trustees of the Village, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 121, 128 (1843).
76. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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harm by locating near cedar groves. If we are talking about blameworthiness,
some moral wrongdoing or conscious act of dangerous risk-taking which in-
duces us to shift the cost to a patricular individual, it simply does not exist
in these cases.
Of course the same is true of cases like Consolidated Rock Products 7 7 and
Goldplatt.78 The users there created the harm only in the sense that they de-
cided to mine sand and gravel in a place which subsequently became desirable
for residential homesites. The list could be extended indefinitely. When a truck
is ordered to use mud-guards to prevent splashing other road users, is this
non-compensable because the trucker has caused the evil - that is, mud-
splashing? Or have other drivers caused the evil by glutting the highways?
It is just as rational to attribute the harm to increased congestion, and thus
spread the cost among all road users, as it is to attribute it to the trucker. The
same could be said of fire regulations imposed upon all old wooden buildings
in a city: has the house owner caused the harm by operating a fire trap; or
is the building a fire trap now because others have made the neighborhood
a congested one? The noxious use, cause-of-the-harm test is simply insufficient
for the task.
THE DImINUTION OF VALUE THEORY
Since emphasis on the diminution of value is probably the most popular
current approach to the taking problem, it is important to understand pre-
cisely what it comprehends. Essentially the theory appears to express two
interrelated ideas: (1) that all legally acquired existing economic values are
property,70 and (2) that while such values nay be diminished somewhat with-
out compensation, they may not be excessively diminished; the meaning of
"excessive" is necessarily imprecise, but it is fairly clear tinder the theory
that it would be unconstitutional to deprive a property of all or substantially
all its economic value.
This approach, too, has tremendous appeal. It seems to bear out the oft-
repeated observation that "the political ethics reflected in the fifth amendment
reject confiscation as a measure of justice." 80 This is a strong and attractive
sentiment, but it has unfortunately been used to obscure the real problems
of the compensation clause. The problem is much more complicated than merely
identifying existing economic values, denominating them property, and pro-
viding a rule that those values may not be wholly or substantially destroyed.
77. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962).
78. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
79. If the theory does not so hold, the exceptions and limitations are well hidden. The
cases all seem to proceed on the assumption that all established economic values are neces-
sarily entitled to constitutional protection against diminution.
80. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
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a. The Test Presupposes a False Definition of Property
The first complication is presented by the fact that we very often per-
mit total destruction of established values; in so doing we circumvent the
diminution of value approach by an alternative analysis, which simply says
that-the interest affected was not property and thus not entitled to constitu-
tional protection. This is a very common approach, used by Holmes himself
on several occasions.8 The classic formulation of the "no-compensation because
no-property" approach was provided by Justice Jackson in the villow River
Power case:
Only those economic advantages are "rights" which have the law back
of them . . . whether it is a property right is really the question to be
answered. s2
The significance of this is that it shows the erroneous and delusive simplicity
of the diminution of value approach. For every time we deny compensation
on the ground that the interest affected was not really a property right, we
repudiate in some measure the essence of the diminution of value test - the
proposition that established economic values as such are entitled to constitu-
tional protection.
In fact there are so many of these non-property situations that one must be
irrevocably led to the conclusion that whatever it is that the compensation
clause is preventing, it is something other than the destruction of estab-
lished economic values. Changes in the common law are frequently made,
and they are changes which may have very substantial economic import;
yet we invariably deny compensation on the ground that there was no property
interest in maintenance of the status quo. In the field of tort law, for example,
such changes as abolition of the privity rule, imposition of the doctrine of
products liability, or the extinguishment of charitable immunity are well known
instances. The constitutionality of such laws is assumed on the ground that
the economic advantage affected - like the common law right to embezzle -
is not property. Similarly in the law of real property, it seems never to have
been suggested that a compensable taking was involved when the courts first
"to6k away" an easement by necessity from an unwilling grantorL although
81. Delusive exactness is a source of fallacy throughout the law. By calling a business
"property" you make it seem like land, and lead up to the conclusion that a statute
cannot substantially cut down the advantages of ownership existing before the statute
was passed .... But you cannot give it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing.
It is a course of conduct.., subject to substantial modification according to time
and circumstances ....
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342-43 (1921) (dissenting opinion). And of course it
was Holmes who pointed out that "there are many things which a man might do at com-
mon law that the states may forbid" and which have never been thought to be property
entitled to constitutional protection. "He might embezzle until a statute cut down his
liberty." Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 113 (1911).
82. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
83. See Powell, The Relationship between Properly Rights and Civil Rights, 15
HAsT IGs L.J. 135, 142 n.35 (1963).
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we today clearly treat an easement as a kind of interest which can give rise
to a taking problem.84
Similarly the legislatures are permitted to prohibit the continuance of busi-
nesses, lawful when established, with ensuing total or near total destruction
of values. As that practice formerly affected lotteries,85 or the manufacture
of liquor,86 it proceeds apace today against debt adjustment,87 and whatever
other businesses which once "were thought useful adjuncts of the state"88 but
have since fallen into popular disfavor. Of these crushing economic dislocationg
for the affected persons we merely say that there was no property interest
involved.
When the legislature destroys 90% of value by prohibiting continuance of
a brickyard, 9 it contents itself with saying the activity was a nuisance, and
everyone knows that there is no property in a nuisance; when it imposes
heavy regulation on the oil industry,90 it says it is preventing waste, and so
too, there is plainly no property interest in waste. Zoning, with losses of 75%
or more of value, is similarly treated.91
The no-property principle has been even more boldly utilized in the de-
velopment of a familiar area of federal law, the so-called navigation servitude.
This judicially devised rule says that, as against subsequent governmental
needs, all previously established private interests or uses in the navigable
waters of the United States must give way. The Court has reached this well
established principle of law by the ipse dixit that it is "inconceivable" that any-
one should obtain a proprietary interest in the navigable waters of the nation. 2
Why it is more inconceivable than that one should obtain a proprietary interest
84. United States v. Virginia-Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961). There seems
to be some tradition of disregarding losses incurred by restrictions on businesses upon
the theory that "frustration" of economic expectations, as opposed to a destruction of
tangible property, cannot ever be compensable. United States v. Grand River Dam Author-
ity, 363 U.S. 229, 236 (1960). Insofar as this view is utilized as a means of excluding
remote or speculative damages, it is justifiable. But if, as sometimes seems to be the case,
intangible losses are simply excluded as such, the theory must be rejected as unsound and
inconsistent with fundamental and quite relevant facts of economic life. See United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945). Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923), is a case in which the inadequacy of the theory is most
apparent.
85. See Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
86. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
87. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). While never made express, it seeins
clear that there was to be no compensation made. See the complaint at Transcript, pp. 3-4.
88. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
89. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408-09 (1915).
90. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
91. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
92. E.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913).
For an extensive discussion of the navigation servitude see Morreale, Federal Powers in




in land, good as against a subsequent state or federal road building plan, or
more inconceivable than that one should obtain a proprietary interest in pe-
troleum, or any other precious resource, has not been explained to the satis-
faction of this observer.93 Nor, incidentally, is this approach a mere isolated
anomaly perpetuated from early federal law. In recent years both California
and Texas have by statute redefined the property acquirable in water so as
to subordinate all appropriations to the subsequently arising needs of munici-
palities in the state. 4 And, as an historical footnote, it is interesting to observe
that in the early days of the nation both North and South Carolina permitted
the state, without compensation, to appropriate land for the construction of
roads and highways.95
The conclusion to be drawn from these examples, just a few among many,
is clear. The diminution of value test gives a highly unreal view of the actual
working of the compensation rule in American law. Destruction of recognized
economic interests, on the ground that there is no property interest, is so
widespread and pervasive that the policy of preventing individual economic
loss as such, can hardly be said to have been given significant recognition by
the courts. Nor can it be seriously argued that the foregoing examples are
part of a special limited class of noxious or harmful uses; they are, like the
typical taking cases, merely uses which have become inconsistent with the
legislatively declared public interest. Thus, the question naturally arises as
to whether or not we have been misled in thinking that the function of the
compensation clause is essentially to protect and maintain established values.
Certainly if we look to what the Court has done, the answer must be that
in fact and in result(the Court has not treated protection of values as its
primary goal.
The next inquiry, then, is whether the maintenance of established values
ought to be accepted as the principal function of the compensation clause. And
to answer this question we turn first to history. One will be surprised if he
assumes that the compensation clause was designed to protect property in-
terests, to maintain at least in substance the economic status quo. A close
analysis of the early history of the compensation provision will not support
the notion, so commonly held, that the taking clause was to be a bulwark
for the maintenance of the established distribution of wealth. The history
93. Though there is perhaps some special historical authority for the navigation rule.
See Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis (1625) Bk. II, ch. II, § XII; but see id. at § XIII.
94. Tex. Civ. Stat Art. 7472 (1954); Calif. Water Code 1460 (1956). The constitu-
tionality of these sections has not, incidentally, been tested.
95. See Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, in
2 Sm-wm EssAys ox CoxsrrutmoNAL LAw 912, 925 (1938). This position %as, of
course, the exception and not the rule.
Perhaps the most questionable use of non-property conceptions to avoid confrontation
of the compensation issue has begun in the area of "government largess" - licensing, pub-
lic employment, etc. The dimensions of this problem are just beginning to be exposed. See
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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of the development of the compensation clause is such an interesting one that
it is presented here in some detail.
b. The Test Is Inconsistent with the Early History of the
Compensation Principle
The direct antecedents of the just compensation provision of the fifth amend-
ment are the jurisprudential writings of such 17th and early 18th century
scholars as Grotius,90 Pufendorf, 9 Bynkershoek,98 Burlamaqui, 0 and Vattel.100
Grotius, the earliest and most important of the writers, stated the "rule" in
language which seems plainly to have influenced the drafters of, the fifth
amendment:
A king may two ways deprive his subjects of their right, either by way
of punishment or by virtue of the eminent power. But if he does it the
last way, it must be for some public advantage, and then the subject
ought to receive, if possible, a just satisfaction for the loss he suffers,
out of the common stock.
101
The others expressed the same principle.
102
Standing alone this formulation reveals nothing about the interests which
these early writers sought to protect, and unfortunately they were not suffici-
ently accommodating to leave a careful analysis of the proper scope of the police
power and its relation to the requirement of compensation. It has been tra-
ditional to treat as obvious that the purpose of the compensation rule was
to mandate the substantial maintenance of existing economic values against
government diminution. This is one of the abiding myths of American con-
stitutional law.
One of the little known facts of our legal history is that Grotius, the father
of the compensation clause, was a firm advocate of government regulation
of prices. He stated the rule that "all men have a right to purchase the neces-
saries of life at a reasonable price, except the owners want them for their
own use."103 Nor was this a quirk in the personality of Grotius. All the early
writers espoused this principle, which was delineated in considerable detail
by Vattel, in 1758:
Men are obliged naturally to assist each other as much as possible, and
to contribute to the perfection and happiness of their fellow creatures;
whence it follows that after the introduction of private property, it be-
came a duty to sell to each other at a fair price what the possessor has
96. DE JuRE BELLErT PACIS (1625), Bk. II, ch. XIV, §§ VII, VIII.
97. DE JuRE NATRUAE ET GENTIUM (1672), Bk. VIII, ch. 5, § 7.
98. QUAESTIONEM Jums PuBLci LiBRI Duo (1737), [2 Tenney Frank trans. 221
(1930)].
99. PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITiC LAw (1747), pt. III, ch. 5, §§ XXV-XXIX,
100. THE LAw OF NATIONS (1758), Bk. I, ch. XX, § 244. James Madison was "ac-
quainted with the works of Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui and Vattel," Brant, The Madi-
son Heritage, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 19 (Cahn ed. 1963).
101. See note 96, at § VII.
102. See notes 97-99.
103. GRoirus, op. cit. supra note 96, at Bk. II, ch. II, § XIX.
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no occasion for, and what is necessary to others; because, since that intro-
duction of private property, no one can by any other means procure the
different things that may be necessary or useful to him and calculated
to render life pleasant and agreeable. Now, since right springs from
obligation, the obligation which we have just established, gives every
man the right of procuring the things he wants, by purchasing them at
a reasonable price from those who have themselves no occasion for them.204
It is thus extremely interesting to note that price control, which Holmes
apologetically upheld with the observation that it "went to the verge of the
law," was a central element in the philosophy of Grotius and his contempo-
raries. Of course this information seems surprising only if we begin with the
assumption that maintenance of values is itself the value upon which the
compensation rule is based. But while we have seen that Grotius obviously
felt that under some conditions values could not be destroyed without com-
pensation, his attitude toward price control suggests that something other
than value maintenance itself is the central idea.
Indeed, as the quotation from Vattel indicates, those philosophers held to
a principle that is essentially non-property oriented. To them the highest value
for government seems to have been the duty so to regulate and adjust economic
power as to "make life pleasant and agreeable" for all the "fellow creatures"
in the society.' 0 5 What is important to note about these statements is that they
state an affirmative principle, rather than a mere grudging acquiescence in a
result which is viewed as essentially at odds with the central values of the
society. There is all the difference in the world between the language of Vattel
and the language of Justice Holmes in speaking once of "the petty larceny
of the police power."'10
We have become so indoctrinated with the idea that quantitative value
maintenance is a constitutional principle and a dictate of "natural equity"'' 1
that we have conveniently forgotten the extensive non-property background
in our law. While it is true that the Roman tradition exalted the free market-
private property concept, 08 that tradition is just one of the roots of our legal
system. Another and equally important part of the background, from which
Grotius drew, must be recognized. That is the Christian tradition, which de-
vised the legal concept of "just price."
just price, a fundamental premise of medieval economic life, was founded
upon the notion that property and economic position must be subordinated
to the attainment of social justice.10 9 In making illegal the selling of an item
104. VATTEL, op. cit. supra note 100, at Bk. , ch. VIII, § 88.
105. Ibid.
106. 1 HoLi s-LAsaK Lnruns 457 (Howe ed. 1953).
107. See Grant, supra note 95.
108. O'BRmN, AN EssAY oN MEDIEvAL EcoNomc TEAcHiNG 104 (1920).
109. Ibid.; 8 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 504 (1932). The maintenance of a just price was "the
whole economic teaching of the Church and the whole economic policy of the State...
What that teaching and policy aimed at was a fair price, which it was believed could only
be found in a stable, regulated price." 1 AsnEY, AN INTRODUCTION "To Ehaisir EcoNomc
HsTORY Aim THEoRY 178, 181, 191 (1923).
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for more than its worth, or the buying of an item for less than its worth, the
proper price was found by repudiating the test of the economic market and
seeking instead "to find a medium between a price so low as to render labourers,
artisans and merchants unable to maintain themselves suitably, and one so
high as to disable the poor from obtaining the necessaries of life.""10
Of course, non-property concepts are not solely the invention of continental
legal systems. The old laws against forestalling, regrating, and engrossing are
well-known fixtures of English legal history."" And those prohibitions against
selling at unreasonably high prices were not, it should be noted, merely re-
straints upon monopoly." 2 Nor were the rules approved in ignorance of the
usual arguments about the sanctity of private property and the virtues of the
free economic market. In fact, in one famous case Lord Kenyon made it a
point to remark that:
So far as the policy of this system of laws [prohibiting selling at unreason-
able prices] has been lately called in question, I have endeavoured to in-
form myself as much as lay in my power, and for this purpose I have
read Dr. Adam Smith's work .... 113
Dr. Smith took a predictably dim view of these offenses. "The popular fear
of engrossing or forestalling may be compared to the popular terrors and
suspicions of witchcraft. The unfortunate wretches accused of this latter crime
were not more innocent of the misfortunes imputed to them, than those who
have been accused of the former.""
4
The existence and acceptance of these elements of the Christian legal tra-
dition by those who formulated the compensation notion should cast the gravest
doubt upon the facile modern assumption that maintenance of established
economic values as such was their central purpose. The evidence certainly
seems to indicate that the mere fact that government activity destroyed existing
economic advantages and power did not disturb them at all.
And the specific evidence which we do have about their views on the scope
of the compensation rule supports these general observations. Interestingly,
they did not give blanket disapproval to all government acts which inflicted
serious or total loss. Quite the contrary, they all talked about a quite specific
and limited situation in describing the need for a compensation rule.
Uniformly the example which the early writers had in mind was that typified
by the wartime situation in which the army, urgently in need of supplies or
funds, seizes them from a citizen near at hand; or the case where the state
seizes a house to prevent its use as a shelter for the enemy, or to make room
110. O'Bamx, op. cit. mpra note 108, at 107.
111. ASHLEY, op. cit. supra note 109, at 182-87; see Jones, Historical Developencnt of
the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE L.J. 905 (1926) ; HANDLER, TADE REGuLATioN,
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS 16 (1960). See also THEOBALD, FREE MEN AND FREE
MAstzrs 13-14 (1963).
112. King v. Waddington, 1 East 143, 102 Eng. Rep. 56 (K.B. 1800).
113. 1 East at 157, 102 Eng. Rep. at 62.
114. 2 THE WEALTH Op NATiONS 125 (Bk. IV, c. 5) (LIX World's Classics, 1904).
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for fortifications?'15 It was only for the losses sustained in such circumstances
that compensation was thought to be required. Significantly, no mention was
made of the losses inflicted by sanitary or safety laws, though they were, of
course, of very ancient origin ;116 nor by the loss inflicted when it was first
decided that easements by necessity must be given;117 nor when the rules of
nuisance law were imposed;118 nor by the variety of rules which put sub-
stantial limitations on the power to dispose of real property.11 And, as we
have seen, the early writers expressly approved the losses sustained by price
regulation laws.
In trying to understand the distinction they must have intended, it seems
clear enough that the forbidden uses were not necessarily the most destructive.
The rule they proposed would seem to require compensation when the army
seizes a single goat of limited value, but not when an extremely valuable ease-
ment of necessity is judicially taken, or an extremely valuable use of property
cut off as a nuisance.
What seemed to concern the early writers was not the fact of loss but the
imposition of loss by unjust means. It was the exercise of arbitrary or tyrannical
powers that were sought to be controlled. As Pufendorf put it, the fear was
that "ill Princes," unless constrained, "may sometimes abuse [their powers]
to the damage and ruin of their subjects."120 The examples they give suggest
a principal fear of ill-considered, hasty, or even discriminatory impositions
created by the pressing necessity of the state to get a job done, and of a pos-
sible animus against those citizens who were not, as Pufendorf put it, "kind
or public spirited enough to offer their money [or property] voluntarily."' 2'
Certainly the foregoing evidence is at least sufficient to suggest that we
must look to some principle other than value maintenance per sc if we are to
find an historically accurate as well as currently workable theory for the taking
cases. Scanty though it is, there is at least some basis in the early writers
for finding that their real concern was a protection of values only as against
government conduct which raised the dangers of arbitrary or tyrannical treat-
ment.
In support of that position it can be demonstrated that the English and
American authorities writing at about the time of the adoption of the fifth
amendment also viewed the provision as a bulwark against unfairness, rather
than against mere value diminution.
115. PuFENwDoRF, op. cit. supra note 97; BuRLAmAQur, op. cit. mipra note 99; and
ByNSR5HOE3-, op. cit. supra note 98, at 222.
116. PoW-F., op. cit. mpra note 83, at 145.
117. Id. at 142.
118. Id. at 142-43.
119. Id. at 140.
120. PurmoaR, op. cit. supra note 97.
121. Ibid.
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c. The Test Is Not Suepported by the Contemporaneous
History of the Amendment
At the outset it must be noted that contemporaneous commentary upon the
meaning of the compensation clause is in very short supply. No really satis-
factory discussion or analysis has been found. But the few authorities which
are available seem to be consistent with the proposition advanced here, that
the clause was designed to prevent arbitrary government action, rather than
to preserve the economic status quo.
In what is perhaps the most revealing commentary extant, St. George
Tucker wrote about the purpose of the taking clause in 1803:
That [provision] which declares that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation, was probably intended to re-
strain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the
army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently prac-
ticed during the revolutionary war, without any compensation whatever.1 2
While there is a great dearth of commentary upon the express problem at
hand, there are, of course, those who will remind us that the framers were
drawn from the property-owning class, 2 3 who will urge that Madison himself
was a "conservative guarantor of the status quo,"'1 24 and who will seek to draw
from those assertions the contrary of the view drawn here about the proper
and intended interpretation of the taking provision. Perhaps the best answer
to such arguments is the analysis advanced by Madison's definitive biographer,
Irving Brant:
It is easy and erroneous to simplify that into a mere statement that gov-
ernments are set up to protect property rights .... But Madison was well
aware that in a competitive society, with public order and private rights
maintained, property would flow ceaselessly into the hands of those most
able to gain and hold it. He was practically saying, therefore, that one of
the first objects of government was to protect the poor and near-poor by
laws restraining concentration of wealth and the power of its holders.
... Madison was not assailing private property. He was seeking to protect
men against property, and to protect property against the destructive
effect of too great concentration ....
Certainly there is nothing here to require adoption of a test that requires a
quantitative interpretation of the taking clause.
Nor is our theory inconsistent with the writing of Blackstone himself. Per-
haps the best remembered champion of the language of private property, he
spoke of property as the third "absolute right" of every Englishman.'2 0 But
the authorities he cites for his famous statement that the law will not authorize
the least violation of property, not even for the general good of the whole
122. TucmR's BLcxTsroNE, CoMMENTAREs 305-06 (appendix) (1803).
123. BRA iT, JA ES MADISON, FATER OF THE CONSTITUrIox¢ 60 (1950).
124. Id. at 175.
125. Id. at 174, 176.
126. 1 BLAcxsToNE, COMMENTARIES* 138.
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community,2 t are the Magna Charta and a series of statutes of the reign of
Edward III. None of those authorities contradicts the thesis put forward
here. Indeed, the Magna Charta itself merely holds that no freeman shall be dis-
seized of his freehold "but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land."' 2 8 And the interpretation put upon that mandate made it no more
than a guarantee of rational treatment in procedure and substance.1 O Indeed,
the example of the requirement of compensation selected by Blackstone is
quite in accord with the views of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek; he
merely argues that compensation would be due when a highway is put across
private land. The property owner in that case is subjected to an economic
burden under circumstances presenting the same dangers as those singled
out by the early writers - appropriation of property by the state for its own
account to finance its own enterprise (a critical factor under the compensation
test to be proposed later in this article). 130 The abandonment of the test of
quantitative diminution of value can thus be seen as quite consistent with
Blackstone.
The same conclusion may be drawn from the famous language of Chief
Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck:13'
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government
does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if any be
prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individual,
fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation?
On its face that language may be viewed as a paeon to the policy of prevention
of private economic loss, but the facts of the case put the statement in quite
a different light. In its simplest terms, the state legislature by statute had
conveyed state-owned land to A; A had subsequently conveyed to B, who was
wholly ignorant of the transaction between the State and A. Apparently A
had bribed some legislators in order to induce passage of the act conveying
the land to him. A subsequent session of the legislature, made aware of A's
chicanery, passed a law rescinding and repealing the act of conveyance to A.
The only problem with this remedial legislation was that at the time of its
passage, the land was owned by B, a perfectly innocent and bona fide purchaser.
In holding that such a statute could not divest B of his property in the land,
Chief Justice Marshall was merely saying, with eminent good sense, that it
was arbitrary and oppressive to make B pay for the dishonesty of A and
the Georgia legislature. And it is in that context that Marshall's statement
on the security of property fairly acquired must be read. The facts in Fletcher
v. Peck illustrate the threat of the state's becoming the direct economic bene-
127. Id. at 139.
128. Magna Charta (1225) 9 Hen. 3, c. 29.
129. 25 Edw. III, st. 5, ch. 4 ordains that none shall "be out of his franchises nor of
his freeholds unless he be duly brought into answer, and forejudged of the same by the
course of the law." See also 28 Edw. III, cl. 3.
130. See discussion following note 137 infra.
131. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810).
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ficiary of its own legislative acts; that threat, not the danger or extent of
private loss, is the lesson of the case.
The more one examines these early explanations of the constitutional pur-
pose of the taking provision, the clearer it becomes that the protection afforded
is most properly viewed as a guarantee against unfair or arbitrary government.
Story, for example, stated that the compensation provision, "is laid down by
jurists as a principle of universal law [because] in a free government, almost
all other rights would become worthless, if the government possessed an
uncontrollable power over the private fortune of every citizen. 1'U2 Even the
first Justice Harlan, paraphrasing Justice Miller, explained the constitutional
purpose of the provision by arguing that: "A government, by whatever name
it was called, under which the property of citizens was at the absolute dispo-
sition and unlimited control of any depositary of power, was, after all, but
a depotism."'
133
d. The Test Imports an Unworkable Problem of Definition
Because the diminution test turns on the degree of quantitative diminution
of value, it is necessary that the property at issue be precisely defined, so that
we can determine how great the impairment of value is. But this is no easy
task. If the government floods 80 acres of a 640 acre farm, is that a total
destruction of 80 acres, or a mere 121/2 percent loss? In a case of compulsory
dedication of real property by a land subdivider, the acreage given up can be
treated as a total loss, or merely as a loss of a small portion of the entire tract, in
which case the end result might even be seen as an increase in the value of
the property because of the prospect of municipal services. In the famous
Pennsylvania Coal case is the loss to be treated as a total taking of that quantum
of coal left in the ground, or as a small fraction of the total productivity of
the mine? These definitional problems are difficult; they have never been
seriously treated in opinions which invariably solve them by flat and unsup-
ported assertions as to the identity of "the" property at issue. Since degree
of loss is the very essence of the test, this is a central problem. The failure to
deal with the issue, and the terrible complexities of trying to do so are further
evidence of the unsatisfactory nature of the diminution of value test.
The series of observations above hopefully suggests that, for purposes of
distinguishing between compensable takings and valid exercises of the police
power, liberating the inquiry from traditional property notions embodied in
the diminution of value approach would be both desirable and consistent with
our constitutional history. It remains for us to use this historical evidence
to construct an affirmative theory which is both administratively workable
and substantively satisfactory.
132. 2 STORY, CONSITUTION 547-48 (4th ed. 1873) (emphasis added). And Blackstone
says that compensability is required to prevent government from "stripping the subject of
his property in an arbitrary manner;" CoMMENTAI ,s 139 (emphasis added).
133. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 237 (1896), citing Loan Ass'n




FORMULATING A THEORY FOR THE TAxlNG CASES
Since the question being asked is what sort of protection is to be given
to property, the initial task must be to develop a workable concept of what
we mean when we talk about property. Aside from its failure to interpret
correctly the policy considerations imbedded in the compensation clause, the
diminution of value approach also suffers critically here: it fails to provide
an adeqtiate definition of the term property itself. A first step in formulating
a better theory must involve finding a substitute for the rigid conception of prop-
erty as a fixed status definable only in reference to existing economic values.
The essence of property, as we actually use the term, is not fixity at all,
but fluidity. Property is the end result of a process of competition among in-
consistent and contending economic values. Instead of some static and definable
quantity, property really is a multitude of existing interests13 which are
constantly interrelating with each other, sometimes in ways that are mutually
exclusive. We can talk about a landowner having a property interest in "full
enjoyment" of his land,135 but in reality many of the potential uses (full en-
joyment) of one tract are incompatible with full enjoyment of the adjacent
tract. It is more accurate to describe property as the value which each owner
has left after the inconsistencies between the two competing owners have been
resolved. And, of course, even then the situation is not static, because new
conflicts are always arising as a result of a change in the neighborhood's
character, or in technology, or in public values. These changes will revise
once again the permitted and permissible uses which we call property. Prop-
erty is thus the result of the process of competition.
Once reoriented to this more fluid concept of property as economic value
defined by a process of competition, the question of when to compensate a
diminution in the value of property resulting from government activity be-
comes a much less difficult one to formulate. The question now is: to what
kind of competition ought existing values be exposed; and, from what kind
of competition ought existing values be protected.
There are a number of answers which might be given to this question.
Values might be protected against all competition which presents a serious
134. It should be clear that the threshold requirement of an interest which is "eligible"
even to participate in the competition and thus to have the opportunity of becoming pro-
tectible property is that the economic interest has come into being as an interest recogniz-
able at law. It could hardly raise a taling question if the government were, from the be-
ginning of the nation, simply to refrain from opening certain of the public domain to
appropriation. It is this qualification which prevents a taking issue from being raised by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in many circumstances. For this reason, it seems proper
to read the decision in the Armstrong case (see note 57 supra and accompanying text) as
turning on a rather narrow dispute over whether the lien had come into being as an in-
terest without reference to the immunity doctrine; that is, the issue was the significance
to be attached to the "prospect" of subsequent ownerslip of the property secured by the
lien at the time the lien attached.
135. A phrase used by Mir. Justice Douglas in his Causby opinion, 328 U.S. at 264-65.
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quantitative challenge; we have seen that this view would inhibit social change
in a way that never has been found acceptable. 18 Values might be exposed
to all competition which presents a claim of higher public interest; this, too,
has been universally rejected, as government would never have to pay for
any legitimate project, such as a road or a school, since those projects are
almost by definition 1a7 treated as of more public importance than the super-
seded private use.
Another answer suggested here requires an attempt to isolate and define
the two different kinds of private economic loss resulting from government
activity and the two different respective roles played by government in the
process of competition from which these losses arise. This analysis rests upon
the distinction between the role of government as participant and the govern-
ment as mediator in the process of competition among economic claims, The
losses to individual property owners arising from government activity of
the first type result in a benefit to a government enterprise; losses arising
from the second type of activity are the result of government mediating con-
flicts between competing private economic claims and produces no benefit
to any government enterprise.
Government as enterpriser operates in a host of areas, requiring money,
equipment and real estate. It maintains an army which must be fed and clothed
and supplied; it builds and maintains bridges and roads and buildings, and
for these it must have land and other economic resources: it operates schools
and offices and must have money to staff and equip them. Unrelated to ancient
and disreputable notions about governmental and proprietary functions, the
concept of government in its enterprise capacity as used here describes the
economic function of providing for and maintaining the material plant, whether
that be the state capitol or a retail liquor store. In this capacity, government
must acquire economic resources, which, by one means or another, it must
get from the citizenry. It is to be noted that in the performance of this enter-
prise capacity, government is very much like those who function in the private
sector of the economy, and indeed is in its resource-acquiring job a competitor
with private enterprisers; it is a consumer of land, machines, clothing, and
the like.
In addition to its enterprise capacity, in which government acquires re-
sources for its own account, government also plays another and quite different
role. It "governs." That is, it mediates the disputes of various citizens and
groups within the society, and it resolves the conflict among competing and
conflicting alternatives. Typically in this function it says, as between neighbors,
136. See discussion in text accompanying notes 79-95 supra.
137. That governmental projects embrace a public interest sufficient to displace all
private uses (without regard to the compensation question, but referring now only to the
question of the hierarchy of public interest) is a principle which has been stated in the
broadest possible terms. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,
426 (1940) ; see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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that one fellow must cease keeping pigs in his backyard or must cease making
bricks at a certain location; as between management and labor it imposes a
duty of collective bargaining; as between tenant and landlord it may adjust
prices or impose certain standards for health and safety. The essence of this
function is that government serves only as an arbiter, defining standards to
reconcile differences among the private interests in the community.
While quite different in design and function, the impact and ultimate pur-
pose of government acting in its roles are quite similar. The impact on in-
dividual property-owners, whether the government is acting in its enterprise
capacity or in its role as mediator, is the same kind of impairment of legally
acquired, established economic values. And in performing both functions the
government imposes upon private property for the ultimate purpose of further-
ing the public interest. Certainly, then, it is not urged that these func-
tions are so sharply distinct as to present a perfect theoretical dichotomy. But
it is urged that as a practical matter the distinction is real and clear enough
to provide the basis for a workable rule of law.
The rule proposed here is that when economic loss is incurred as a result ,
of government enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise capacity,
then compensation is constitutionally required; it is that result which is to
be characterized as a taking. But losses, however severe, incurred as a con-
sequence of government acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed
as a non-compensable exercise of the police power. The detailed application
of this theory to the prominent and difficult cases and the precise meaning
to be given to the noton of enterprise capacity are the subject of the last
section of this article. For the present it is sufficient to understand the pro-
posal in the rather general terms already indicated and to note two prelimi-
nary facts.
First, examples of takings given by the early writers all fit quite clearly
into the enterprise capacity, as do such classic takings as the appropriation
of land for a highway or a public building; also such traditional police power
regulation as safety laws and price control involve the government only in
its capacity as a mediator.
Second, it is important to be clear at the outset that this proposal is quite
different from the traditional distinction between takings and regulations at-
tributed to Harlan, though it bears some resemblance to that approach. As
we shall see, this test differs fundamentally from the old test in that a finding
of enhancement of the resource position of a government enterprise does not
necessarily require a physical invasion, or an acquisition of a formal proprietary
interest. Moreover, non-compensability will never turn on a finding that the
government action is a "mere restriction upon use," but will depend upon an
examination of the identities of the parties involved in the competition and
of the role of the government in that conflict.
We have seen that in devising a model of competition for analysis we have
shifted emphasis from the old question of "how much" may values be dimin-
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ished to the question "against what qualitative kinds of value-diminishing acts
should existing values be insulated." Having established the view of "compe-
tition" as the essence of property, we now move to an analysis of the distinction
between fair and unfair competition as the key to answering the compensation
question. As already suggested, notions of fair and unfair competition are
equated here with the distinction between government imposing economic loss
as a mediator among private competing interests and government imposing
economic detriment in support of resource-acquisition by itself in its enterprise
capacity.
Why that distinction is equated with fairness and unfairness is suggested
by our previous conclusion that the real function of the compensation rule
is to provide a bulwark against arbitrary, unfair, or tyrannical government.
It is submitted here that resource-acquisition by government in its enterprise
capacity presents a three-fold source of such dangers, and that the compen-
sation provision can satisfactorily serve its function to the extent that it im-
munizes existing values against these risks by requiring the payment of com-
pensation whenever loss is occasioned by exercise of the enterprise capacity.
Let us examine these three dangers.
a. The Risk of Discrimination
In typical competition among private interests, both the participants and
the issue in conflict come into being independently of any governmental activity.
The problem goes to government for mediation fully defined; government
serves only the function of resolving it one way or the other. An alleged
nuisance would be an example of such a private debate. But when the govern-
ment is engaged in resource acquisition for its own account, it typically plays
a much larger and more central role; it frequently both creates and defines
the need. It has the power to say what commodity is needed, at what location
it is needed, in what amounts and at what times. Moreover, in a good many
cases the resources sought are more or less fungible.
For these reasons the official procurement process often provides a par-
ticularly apt opportunity for rewarding the faithful or punishing the oppo-
sition. In obtaining an item such as an automobile, for example, the range
of choices could produce a discomforting prospect for discrimination among
the citizenry; whether the choice is made for a particular reason, as a political
choice, or for no reason at all, the situation could be an undesirable one, Of
course just how much choice there will be varies greatly depending on the
nature of the acquisition: there will probably be less choice in planning a
highway right-of-way than in obtaining an automobile: and perhaps even
less choice in selecting a dam or power site.
While there was no evidence of a discriminatory motive in such a case
as Central Eureka Mining,18 for example, the very fact of imposition of bur-
den on a single industry out of many similarly situated seems to illustrate
138. 357 U.S. 155 (1958); see discussion following note 68 vepra.
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the danger. As Justice Harlan suggested in his dissent in that case, the
question naturally arises, why was the gold mining industry selected for special
treatment. The existence of such a risk should be reason enough to desire
protection from the opportunity for injustice.
b. The Risk of Excessive Zeal
A second characteristic of the enterprise capacity is the fact that in per-
forming this function the government acts as a judge in its own case. The
restraint and detached reflection which one expects from a legislature pre-
siding over a contest between two private interests, and the consideration
required before established interests are put aside, may well be feared to be
wanting when government is called upon to implement its own projects.
Just as a fear of lack of restraint in the heat of military necessity first led
to expressions of the need for a compensation rule when procurement was
involved, such recent cases as Central Eureka Mining support a current con-
cern that government involved in pursuing an important national goal, in
which it is an active participant with an economic stake in the outcome, may
be prone to display a questionable zeal in acquiring the tools needed to get
on with the job.
Obviously the potential lack of restraint will not always be realized, es-
pecially in a government where the executive department must always get
support for its plans either in the legislature or the courts, but that danger
may be greater when a self-interest is involved can hardly be denied. It is
the difference between legislators debating a typical controversial issue on
which there are conflicting views and their deciding to enact a law that will
double their own salaries.
c. The Scope of Exposure to Risk
Finally, and perhaps most important, there is an issue of scope of risk
similar to the question of duty in the law of torts - and it ought to be solved
in the same way. In torts the usual rule is that once the duty is established,
the monetary damages to which one may be subject are unlimited.139 But the
scope of risks to which one can be made liable is dearly circumscribed.1 40 Pre-
cisely the same distinction is proposed here. As we have seen, a limitation
rule based merely on diminution of value has never been acceptable;141 but
it is possible to protect established interests by limiting the scope of compe-
tition to which they are subject. A good argument can be made that the proper
way to draw the line limiting exposure to losses is with the distinction between
the demands of private competition and those of resource-seeking government
enterprises.
139. E.g., In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co, [1921] 3 KB. 560.
140. E.g, Palsgraf v. Long Island TLtR, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 NsE. 99 (1928).
141. Of course there have been some efforts to deal with the limitation of risk prob-
lems quantitatively in torts both within and without the negligence framework. Statutory
damage limitations in some wrongful death acts is an exmmple of the former, and scheduled
benefit plans in workmen's compensation laws an instance of the latter.
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The private competition among property owners is generally characterized
by two factors: the competition to which one must submit is both localized
and reciprocal. Thus, for example, in the typical nuisance case the users with
whom an industrialist must compete are usually that limited group of property
owners who can see, hear, or smell his operations. That class of persons who
have standing to challenge his use as a nuisance owe him a parallel duty to
use their property in a way that is not offensive to his reasonable uses. In
the same sense, the typical zoning case is one in which there is a circumscribed
physical community to which every owner must submit (or, in which he must
compete), and everyone in that community is subject to the same sort of limi-
tation in his favor. A like limitedness and reciprocity exists in such typical
police power regulations as fire safety laws; there is a specific area or com-
munity to which a man is subject, and the other members of that community
have similar obligations to him.
This characteristic is not to be confused with the traditional notion of re-
ciprocal benefits. It is perfectly clear that restrictions may be wholly at odds
with benefits received; indeed, it is understood that a restriction may put
one out of business and thus impose total detriment with no benefit. That is
not the point here. The only characteristic sought to be identified is that of
limited risk, and a balance only in the sense of reciprocity of opportunity or
reciprocity of competition.
Conversely, the subordination of existing private uses to governmental re-
source-acquisition provides no such limitations. Property owners in compe-
tition with one another are each subject to similar duties and to the demands
of each other individually or in concert; the physical community more or less
defines the scope of the risk, and each member of the community is similarly
situated. But if the federal government decides to put a dam or a military
base in that community, the scope of risk to which the property owner is
subject is vastly increased. He is no longer subjected merely to the typical
and ordinary risks of the community of which he is a part, but to a risk which
in its type and size may be extraordinary and unprecedented. Certainly it
was the imposition of this sort of unforeseeable and sudden risk, extraordinary
in local affairs, which concerned the early writers.
Moreover the reciprocal element which seems to invest the competition
among private users with an element of fairness, or at least of sportsmanship,
is absent when one of the parties is the government. In its capacity as a seeker
of resources it often has no presence in the community which is reciprocally
subject to limitation. When the government seeks a site for a dam or a high-
way all the obligation flows in one direction; the private citizen's use is sub-
jected to the proposed public use, but the government has no corresponding
physical existence which is subject to the claims of its neighbors. It is not
a part of the competing community. And even when the government has a
preexisting physical presence in the community, as in the airport noise cases,
traditional doctrines of sovereign immunity have largely insulated it from any
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role in the interplay of duties and rights which characterize the private com-
munity.
These differences suggest a rule which allows for subjection of existing
uses to a competition with other private uses, but denies - except upon
compensation - subordination of private uses to the public interest in the
form of government resource-acquisition in its enterprise capacity.
To be sure, the three dangers just discussed are by no means always present
in government enterprise procurement, nor are they always absent in the
resolution of private sector disputes. But, then, the proper goal of a compen-
sation rule can be viewed as similar to that produced by a conflict of interest
law: its purpose is to shield citizens from the burden of proving discrimination
or lack of restraint in every case. It thus gives security against the possibility
of such conduct by removing the opportunity. Likewise, in setting a scope of
exposure to risk, the principal purpose of a compensation rule would be to make
a general policy decision about the nature of economic security the society
desires to provide, rather than to guarantee a particular degree of economic
security for each piece of property for each individual.
APPLYING THE TAKING TEsT
It remains now only to observe how the proposed theory works when ap-
plied to the cases. The precise rule to be applied is this: when an individual
or limited group in society sustains a detriment to legally acquired existing
economic values as a consequence of government activity which enhances
the economic value of some governmental enterprise, then the act is a taking,
and compensation is constitutionally required; but when the challenged act
is an improvement of the public condition through resolution of conflict within
the private sector of the society, compensation is not constitutionally required.
To be sure, the acquisition of title or the taking of physical possession will
be present in the great majority of taking cases under this theory. But -
and this is the important point - the presence or absence of a formal title-
acquisition and/or invasion will never be conclusive. These formalities are
not necessarily present when the government, as an enterpriser, is acquiring
resources for its own account. With that in mind, we may now turn to the
specific cases.
Because the airport noise cases have been so prominent in recent litigation
involving the meaning of the taking provision, 142 an analysis of those cases
presents an appropriate starting point to test the proposed approach. These
cases are particularly useful for another reason; they present the identical
factual problem in a variety of formal settings. When a landowner adjacent
to an airport is disturbed by direct overflights, as in Causby,4 3 it is possible
142. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946). Among the interesting more recent federal cases are Batten v. United
States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963) ; Mock v. United States,
32 U.S.L. WEEK 2435 (Ct Cl. 1964); Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. CL 1964).
143. See note 142 supra.
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to resolve the taking issue by quite traditional means: the overflight call be
treated as the acquisition of a servitude, an interest in property, accompanied
by physical possession and an exclusion of the former owner; this is a taking
in a classic form.1 44 Indeed the Court's opinion in Causby made a special point
of stating that the government's act was "a direct invasion of respondent's
domain" and held that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount
of damage resulting from it, . . . that determines the question whether it is
a taking."'1 45
Of course it is possible to cause harm identical to that in Causby without
any such "direct invasion," as when noise and glare is imposed by a flight
over a neighboring tract of land, rather than over the plaintiff's own land.
Under traditional views the absence of an overflight raises the gravest doubts
about whether there has been a compensable taking, and the current pogition
seems to be that in the absence of an overflight there is no taking.
140
Essentially the same factual problem might be presented in yet another way.
By appropriate zoning of land near an airport, government might prevent
the problem from arising by prohibiting the institution or continuance of
uses which would be inconsistent with anticipated airport activities,
1 47 Here
the government act is even less like a traditional taking case than the other
two situations, and it is not clear whether compensation would be granted
in such a case.
The uncertainty of treatment under the traditional invasion theories is
equalled, at least, by uncertainty as to how the cases would be treated under
a diminution of value test. In Causby, the leading case, it seems that the extent
of damage was only a moderate portion of the total value of the land; the
evidence as reported by the Court showed only that there was "destruction
of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm,"' 48 and the case fell
short of being one in which the regulation "deprive(d] the owner of all or
most of his interest in the subject matter .... ,,149 In the recent Goldblatt case,
it should be noted, the Court held that "the fact that [the regulation] deprives
the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional."'
1 0
144. Le., the imposition of a servitude; see Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.
327 (1922).
145. 328 U.S. 256, 265-66 (1945).
146. See Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955
(1963). The present view of the courts is that physical invasion merely by "sound and
shock waves" is not a sufficient invasion to constitute a taking. Avery v. United States,
330 F.2d 640, 645 (Ct. Cl. 1964), citing Batten.
147. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUPREmE CouRt RmEW 63, 90; see text at note
64 supra. See also Indiana Toll Road Comm'n v. Jankovich, 193 N.E.2d 237 (Sup. Ct, Ind,,
1963), cert. granted, 84 S. Ct. 1352 (1964). The state courts have usually required com-
pensation in such cases, but not usually for the right reason. See note 64 supra; Roark
v. City of Caldwell, 394 P2d 641 (Idaho, 1964) (citing cases).
148. 328 U.S. at 259.
149. Id. at 262 n.7.
150. 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
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And only two months prior to the decision in Goldblatt the Court reaffirmed
its position in Causby by saying that in Causby it had "held that the United
States by low flights of its military planes over a chicken farm made the
property unusable for that purpose and that therefore there had been a 'tak-
ing' .... ,"15 In short, as has already been repeatedly indicated, the diminution
of value test as used by the Court is wholly unreliable and unpredictable.
By contrast, under the test here proposed the three airport noise situations
would be treated identically, and as quite simple and straightforward cases.
Plainly the operation of the airport facility is an example of a government
enterprise. Plainly, too, the acquisition of a right to impose such noise and
glare on the enterprise's neighbors, whether called an easement, a servitude,
or whatever, is a valuable addition to the assets of the enterprise; assuming
that property or tort doctrines, such as negative easement or nuisance, pre-
vented the private enterpriser from so imposing on his neighbors, it is a re-
source which the private party would have either to forego or to buy for a
valuable consideration. But by virtue of its special position the government
has acquired this asset for its own account without buying it; this is precisely
what the rule proposed here will not allow. Compensation must be paid.
Conversely, cases like Goldblatt 152 or Consolidated Rock Productsl r which
are treated as difficult ones by the courts, are readily recognizable as non-
compensable under the proposed theory. The zoning regulation in those situ-
ations does not add to the resources of any official enterprise; it is the regu-
latee's neighbors as citizens who benefit directlyY154 The industrial user has
simply been subjected to a competition with his new neighbors, and he has lost.
Likewise the famous decision in Miller v. Schocne,153 denying compensation,
must be recognized as a correct one. There a Virginia statute required the
destruction of red cedar trees in order to prevent the spread of a communicable
plant disease to apple orchards nearby. The difficulties created by looking at
the extent of harm, the imposition of economic loss on one person to aid
another, or the lack of a formal invasion are all eliminated if one concentrates
on the critical fact that the regulation at issue did not add to the assets of
any government enterprise, but merely resolved a case of conflicting uses
between neighboring proprietors.
151. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 88 (1962) (emphasis added).
152. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
153. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 370 P.2d 342, appeal disnnissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962).
154. It will be seen that the test of benefit received by the government enterprise is
being used in the sense of the rather direct addition of a value which would economically
be considered an asset by a private business. It is of course true that every safety law might
be considered an asset of the police or fire or health departments, in the sense that good
health and safe conditions will reduce their work load. But such collateral benefits are not
considered assets or resources here any more than the prevalence of cancer is considered
an asset of any given doctor or hospital. No such person could claim his property was taken
if the government found a cure for cancer.
155. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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Of course the test proposed here is not limited to cases involving land
ownership, but is equally applicable to the many other areas in which taking
problems arise. Thus nationalization of the railroads would be compensable
for the obvious reason that such an act would itself be the acquisition of a
government enterprise. Conversely such common regulations as health and
safety laws, liquor regulation, and statutes such as workmen's compensation
would not require compensation for the reason that in none of these situations
is government operating in its resource-acquiring, enterprise-enriching ca-
pacity.15
6
As the preceding examples show, the test proposed here would leave the
majority of current holdings intact. There is, however, one established line
of cases that would seem to require reversal, and therefore special mention
is appropriate. This is the venerable group of grade crossing cases. 157 It
has been almost the universal rule to charge the costs of the grade separation
to the railroad.1 8 Certainly the maintenance and operation of the public high-
way must be considered a governmental enterprise. In acquiring the building
of a grade separation the state is simply adding to the economic status of the
highway by extinguishing a servitude (the railroad grade crossing) appur-
tenant to its highway property. Thus viewed, the grade crossing cases seem
indistinguishable in principle from cases like Causby, which present the reverse
of the same coin. In Causby, the government facilitates the flow of traffic to
and from its airport enterprise by taking an easement across private property;
here the government facilitates the flow of traffic across its highway enter-
prise by extinguishing a private easement across its property. Despite their
long and quite consistent history, the grade crossing cases simply will not
withstand this analysis and must therefore be disapproved. 159
There are, to be sure, some cases which do not so readily submit to analysis
and classification as those treated in the preceding few pages. The idea of a
- 156. In a technical sense certain situations like workmen's compensation, since they
may involve a payment to a government fund, seem to fit the description of an enterprise.
E.g., Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (workmen's compensa-
tion); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911) (Bank depositor's protection
fund); California Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951) (assigned risk law). But
here the government acts only as a stakeholder for the redistribution of economic values
to the regulatee's private competitors, usually a customer or employee in these situations.
The clue that these cases are to be treated as non-compensable non-enterprise situations
is the fact that they might alternatively be administered either through a private or a
government agency. Thus the involvement of the government, when it occurs, is irrelevant,
For an alternative analysis of these cases, see note 175 inlra.
157. E.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953);
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935); Erie R.R. v. Public Util.
Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921). See text at notes 71-72 sufpra.
158. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, 438 (1914).
159. The typical rationale used in the cases, that having caused the harm the railroads
must bear the cost of eliminating the evil, has been critically discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 73-78 supra.
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government enterprise is not a rigid and mechanical'notion, nor is it always
crystal clear whether, if there is a government enterprise involved, it is being
enriched by the challenged regulation. Although the precise elements of the
enterprise function cannot be mechanistically delineated, the concept is none-
theless workable in even the most difficult taking cases, as will be shovm by
the following discussion. The two cases about to be analyzed are representative
of the most difficult and unorthodox forms in which the taing issue arises.
Yet the concepts and tests proposed here can be applied even to these cases
with reasonable clarity.
Central Eureka Mining 160 is perhaps the best known of these cases. It is
not easy to determine at first glance whether or not the government order
shutting down the gold mines was an act of enterprise resource-acquisition.
From one perspective the case looks very much like Miller v. Schoene, seeming
to involve the prohibition of one enterprise in order to foster those which are
deemed to have a higher usefulness to society. But closer examination reveals
a critical difference. It was clear in the Central Eureka case that the order
shutting the mines was designed to force the miners into essential war work.
Since the true effect of the order was to decrease the competition for labor
in favor of war industries, and since government was the sole customer of
these industries, the order in essence forced a reduction in price for the cus-
tomer of these industries - the government. The real competitor of the gold
mines in that instance was the government in the form of its suppliers as
rival employers. Thus, despite superficial appearances, the situation was not
one of competition between two private industries. Circuitous though the
approach was, its net effect was to enhance the government's position as the
enterpriser supplying a war machine. The situation in its effect is rather like
that which would obtain if, instead of condemning land for a road, the state
zoned it "for highway right of way only," thus making itself the sole possible
buyer. No doubt everyone would consider such an act compensable.10' For
the same reason the closing of the mines should have been held compensable.
It ought to be noted in regard to the Central Eureka case that it presented
precisely the sort of dangers against which the compensation clause seems
to have been aimed. Government imposed specifically upon the gold mining
industry a heavy burden which was unique and quite beyond the ordinary
competitive situation in that industry; it imposed a burden created by the
waging of the war. The pressures upon government agencies to wage the war
as expediently as possible led to the realization of the potential for self-inter-
ested regulation lacking the safeguard of detached consideration by a neutral
mediator. And, finally, as the petitioners claimed, they seem to have been
singled out for special treatment, unlike that accorded other similarly situated
industries. For all these reasons compensation should have been required in
the Central Eureka case.
160. 357 U.S. 155 (1958) ; see discussion in notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
161. Joint Meeting v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (1961).
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Central Eureka became a problem case because the government proceeded in
an unconventional manner to achieve its purpose. But that case is by no means
unique. Indeed, local governments have become highly ingenious at using the
form of use regulation to accomplish almost any result desired. 102 Perhaps the
most interesting and instructive example is found in a recent New Jersey
case, which unfortunately did not reach the United States Supreme Court.10
In that case plaintiff owned a tract of swampy land at the edge of Parsippany,
a large and developing township. The land was particularly suitable for wild-
life and flood control purposes, and it was clear that no significant commercial
uses could be made of the land unless it were filled. The evidence showed
that township officials had "the expectation or hope that higher governmental
authority might well acquire the area as part of a large and much discussed
flood control project to benefit the entire ... Valley."'1'
Against this background a fascinating series of zoning ordinances was enacted.
First the swamp area was zoned in the township's most restrictive residential
classification. "[S]ince no one would build an expensive home in a marsh,"
the ordinance "served the practical purpose of precluding all development.," 115
A few years later the ordinance was amended to create an "Indeterminate
Zone Classification" which "forbade any new use or change in existing use
except for agricultural purposes or the growing of fish, water fowl and water
plants and also forbade any dumping ... ."16 Finally, in 1960, the township
devised the form of regulation which produced the legal challenge. The in-
troductory paragraph to the new regulation expressly stated that "these areas
can perform a function for the Township ...if they are properly regulated
in their uses.' 1 67 The ordinance then proceded to specify the uses which
could be made of the land, among which the following were dominant: (1)
"outdoor recreational uses operated by a governmental division or agency ;"
(2) "conservation uses 'including drainage control, forestry, wildlife sanctu-
aries and facilities for making same available and useful to the public;'" (3)
"township sewage treatment plants and water supply facilities."' 08
By the time they had finished, the township authorities had made it about
as explicit as possible that they were treating the plaintiff's land as a public
facility. The consequence of the so-called zoning law was to make the property
almost as much an adjunct of the government park, recreation, and utility
system as if it had purchased a fee simple interest. Under the test proposed
here there can be no doubt that the land had, at least in substantial part, been
162. See cases cited at notes 62-66 supra.
163. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
164. 193 A.2d at 235.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Id. at 236.
168. Ibid. No practical economic uses were in fact available under these restrictions.
Id. at 239-40.
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added to the resources of the township in several of its enterprise capacities;
thus compensability is clear despite the facade of "mere" regulation.
A somewhat more difficult question is presented by the first of the zoning
ordinances, where the regulation did not blatantly open the land to the public
but appeared to be nothing more than a traditional example of residential
zoning. While it is necessary in order to resolve this question to go behind
the face of the ordinance, the result ought not to be in doubt. Plainly this
ordinance was not a mere classification for restricted residential uses, since
the evidence showed that the land could not and would not be used for resi-
dence. The real consequence of the regulation was to prevent any development
of the land in order to effect an option on the property at present undeveloped
values for future use in official flood control and conservation uses. The evi-
dence showed that this zoning law was merely a less candid form of the device
used in Miller v. City of Beaver Falls 1 6 9 - that is, platting undeveloped private
lands for parks or roads or schools, with the effect of preventing development
and thus holding down the price for future proposed public acquisition. Since
such platting has the economic effect of acquiring an option to buy at a given
price, it should be treated as a resource acquisition for whatever governmental
enterprise is receiving the benefit of the option. Thus, under the proposed
test, even the original residential zoning ordinance, which had none of the
characteristics of a traditional "taking," would require compensation.
The- Central Eureka and Parsippany cases have been selected for extended
treatment because they particularly exemplify the kind of taking cases which
today give the courts trouble. They are difficult cases for the courts because
they present situations where there has been no acquisition of title or physical
invasion and where the challenged act has been in a form traditionally treated
as a non-compensable exercise of the police power; that is, cases where gov-
ernment's act is in the form of mere restriction upon use. Moreover, in rep-
resenting instances of total or near total destruction of value, the two cases
illustrate the inconsistency with which the factor has been handled; in" Central
Eureka the Court found no taking; in Parsippany the court found a taking
expressly because of the extent of economic loss incurred.
Hopefully the treatment of these unorthodox cases here demonstrates that
the proposed test of compensability provides a workable doctrine in both con-
ventional and so-called difficult cases. Nonetheless, this discussion cannot be
concluded without noting a few classes of cases which call for independent
treatment.
Reciprocal Benefit. First, and simplest, of the exceptions is the group of
reciprocal benefit cases. These are cases in which a restriction clearly enhances
the resource value of a government enterprise, but where compensation is prop-
erly denied on the ground that the "victims" received benefits which equal
or exceed the detriment imposed.'7 0 Compulsory dedication laws often may
169. 368 Pa. 189,82 A.2d 34 (1951).
170. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 267 (1939).
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be so analyzed. While a developer may be required to dedicate some portion
of his tract for roads, schools, or parks, the prospect and promise of urban
facilities and services will often improve the value of the remaining portion
of the tract sufficiently to more than offset the loss sustained in the dedication.1 71
Incidental Benefit. Another group of cases in which compensation must be
denied, despite the fact of increase in the vilue of a government enterprise,
are those in which the government obtains the benefit incidentally along with
all the private citizens in a community, rather than as a result of its special
status as the sovereign. Suppose, for example, that a town enacts an ordinance
requiring all mining enterprises to operate so as to maintain subjacent support
for all neighboring properties. The result of such a rule would be protection
for private landowners insofar as they bordered on mining properties, and
it would also protect government property which borders on the mining
property. Thus, if a state highway adjoins the mine, the consequences of the
ordinance would be an enhancement of the value of the government enterprise,
the highway. Yet this advantage would be non-compensable, because the gov-
ernment profited only as an incidental beneficiary of a rule enacted to resolve
a controversy between private parties. In this sense it can be said the govern-
ment benefits as a private competitor. The reason for this distinction seems
clear enough. The rule of compensability proposed here is predicated on the
distinction between losses incurred as a result of competition among private
interests and those which result solely from the government's operation of
its enterprises. When government benefits hi such cases as the subjacent support
situation, a form of private competition rather than government resource ac-
quisition has occurred. Thus, the government need not compensate whenever
it benefits as any other member of the community does from an activity which
would not require compensation from any private property owner.172
Perhaps the most important current application of this exception to the
general rule is in the access cases which have been so numerous and so trouble-
some for the courts. 73 In these cases, typically, government changes the loca-
tion of its highway enterprise by diverting traffic, or by replacing an old high-
way with a new limited-access turnpike, or by closing a road completely. As
a result property owners may sustain an economic loss. It would seem helpful
to consider these cases in the same category as those in which one individual
has received a benefit as a result of his proximity or favorable location in re-
spect to the property of another. When, in the private sphere, an economic
loss is sustained as a result of one party's moving or closing his business, no
action for damages or compensation is allowed. Insofar as government exer-
171. See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119
(1964).
172. Application of this rule to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417
(1922), would have required a decision for the government, as Brandeis urged in dissent.
173. Cases are collected in the note at 73 A.L.R.2d 640, 652 (1960). See also Covey,
Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 Nw. tT.L. REv. 587 (1961).
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cises the same privilege which is available to every private citizen, it ought
likewise to be free from a duty to compensate.
While freedom to change uses or location has been only fitfully recognized
as the essence of the access cases in state courts, the Supreme Court has never
had any trouble with this species of case. Thus in Reichclderfcr v. Quinn, 74
when the United States decided to convert some park land next to the claim-
ant's property into a site for a fire station, the Court did not hesitate in holding
that no compensation was due. The government in Rcichcldcrfcr had done no
more than any private citizen may do to his neighbor; if one man owns a
theatre which benefits his neighbor's restaurant, the restaurant owner is
without remedy if his neighbor converts the theatre into a warehouse and
thus terminates the primary source of customers for the restaurant. In this
sense, situations like Reichelderfer and the access cases are wholly unlike the
typical compensation case - acquisition of a highway right of way, or a flight
easement, or a ship - in which the government inflicts a loss in a way which
no private citizen would be permitted to do.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the test proposed here is in-
tended only as a guide to dealing with the general problem presented by gov-
ernment activity which inflicts economic loss upon an individual or selective
group within the society. No claim is made that the enterprise test is a magical
formula which will with perfect symmetry solve every conceivable question
of government activity which affects the economic status of individuals. Legal
problems are simply too diverse and complex for the application of any such
universal solvents. Certainly there are any number of situations which might
abstractly qualify as "takings" under the test proposed here, which cannot
be deemed to require compensation. The imposition of a fine in a criminal
proceeding, the proceeds of which go into the state's general funds, is con-
ceptually a taking under the formula suggested here. But we recognize a
privilege to impose such deprivations in order to promote an important policy,
just as we recognize an exception to the involuntary servitude proscription
by permitting involuntary military service to be required. That such excep-
tions may be logically inconsistent with other possible cases when a privilege
is denied proves only that law must pay some deference to tradition and his-
tory, even in derogation of antiseptic rationality.
Likewise, it is recognized that every tax technically fits the description of
a taking as formulated here (just as it does, incidentally, under the old Harlan
invasion theory). But here, too, the temptation to turn the proposed rule
into an intellectual plaything must yield to an attempt to find workable rules
for a real world. Of course a government act is not immunized from the
compensation provision of the Constitution merely because it has been labelled
a tax. But most taxes are not takings because they incorporate precisely the
goal which the compensation rule is designed to achieve: they spread the
174. 287 U.S. 315 (1932).
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cost of operating the governmental apparatus throughout the society rather
than imposing it upon some small segment of it. Once that cost has been
broadly diffused, though perhaps not to every member of the society nor to
each in identical amount, it would seem that the essential problem of the taking
provision, as delineated earlier, would be overcome.1 5
With these perspectives in mind, it should be possible to approach the prob-
lem fruitfully. In essence, a court ought to ask itself these questions: first, does
this case raise the sort of issue with which the taking provision was designed
to deal; that is, does it present a case of essentially individualized cost-bearing
of some public improvement? If the answer to this question is no, as it is
with most tax measures, then the constitutional issue may be dismissed
forthwith. Second, is some privilege being invoked which must be recognized
as an exception to the compensation rule, such as the right to impose fines
in a criminal proceeding? Unless the answer here is yes, we must then go
on to ask the last question: is the loss incurred here a consequence of resource-
acquisition by a governmental enterprise? The response to that final question
should determine the issue of compensation.
175. The cases where the cost has already been widely spread do not provide the usual
taking litigation. The typical and classic cases - the ones that have presented difficulties -
are almost uniformly cases where loss has been sharply individualized, as in Mugler,
Hadacheck, Caltex, Catesby, Central Eureka, Goldblatt, Consolidated Rock Producls and
Miller v. Schoene.
But certain cases in which taking problems have been raised might well have been
treated as non-compensable on the ground that the cost was, through cost increases of the
products involved, so widely diffused that no substantial taking problem was raised. See
cases cited in note 156 supra. Interestingly, these are cases in which the diminution of value
test may finally play a useful role. It can be said that it is only insofar as the regulation
does not destroy the business that it is possible to spread the cost sufficiently through price
adjustment. It is to be noted that in such cases the burden seems to be uniformly imposed
on all competitors throughout the industry, which fact makes the cost-passing-through-
price-increase notion possible. The railroad grade crossing cases (cited in note 157 supra)
are distinguishable for the reason that the burden there lacks such uniformity.
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